Nonviolent Struggle: Ethiopian Exceptionalism? – Part I
By Jawar Mohammed*
Part I
The long oppressed citizens of Tunisia and Egypt have freed themselves. Libyans are almost there. Bahrainis, Yemenis, Algerians, and Moroccans are in the middle of fierce struggles. Our neighbors, Djiboutians, have also risen up. In Ethiopia, the debate is raging over whether the current wave of people’s uprising should, could or would reach Meles Zenawi? While the successes in the Arab world have a visibly energizing effect, skepticism is still dominating the discourse in much of sub-Saharan Africa.
Fortunately, in the last month, most of the misconceptions about nonviolent resistance have been debunked. Thanks to the tantalizing nonviolent discipline demonstrated by the Egyptian protesters, the cultural determinism school of thought, which long declared Arab and African societies as incompatible with ‘civilized’ politics have been practically refuted. The growing successes of civilian movements against the brutal regimes in Libya, Yemen and Bahrain have disproved the belief that nonviolent resistance works only against soft-authoritarians who value human life.
Skeptics are using “Ethiopian Exceptionalism” to argue that nonviolent strategies would not work in Ethiopia. Three of the most repeated arguments are: ethnic fragmentation, composition of the military and low Internet penetration. These arguments have strong factual bases and do not warrant outright dismissal. However, Ethiopia, having a different condition from Egypt or Tunisia, does not necessarily prevent waging a successful nonviolent resistance. It just requires a strategy specifically tailored for the exceptional realities in Ethiopia.
The Internet
Social media gave a tremendous boost to organizers in Egypt and Tunisia. But, its role is exaggerated. Now, some are saying nonviolent strategies don’t work in the absence of extensive access to Internet. However, it is important to remember that nonviolent movements have achieved their objectives in India, Chile, South Africa, Philippines, etc. even before the invention of the Internet. The Internet made some aspects of strategic planning easier and faster. It eliminated the security risks involved in clandestine physical meetings while making it simpler to reach and mobilize large population, quickly.
Less than 1% of Ethiopians have access to the Internet through a single provider owned by the state. This will obviously make Ethiopian organizers less advantageous than their North African counterparts. Yet, it is primarily the critical mass (students and young professionals) that is involved at the strategic planning stage. In Ethiopia, sizable members of this social group have access to Internet and mobile phones. Besides, as we have observed elsewhere, once a resistance movement takes off, a regime will most likely cut all communication services, rendering the Internet useless. Therefore, organizers have to develop alternative means of communication in order to coordinate actions and expose the regime’s atrocities.
Egyptians were not fully prepared for the Internet blackout. But, they overcame these challenges by reaching out to the outside world to which Google responded by creating a voice-to-text system. The call to tweet system allowed people to use landlines to leave messages that were posted on their twitter accounts as tweets. As such, the low Internet penetration will not save Meles; it might just make it a bit harder for the organizers. In fact, if he chooses to follow on Mubarak’s footsteps and unplug both the Internet and telephone, he will be the one at the losing end as his security apparatus, party structure and public share the same Telecom system. Shutting off the country’s sole Telecom system will disconnect most of his oppressive machinery. This was one of the factors for the quick demise of Mubarak’s 1.5 million-strong police. Since the least financed individual citizens have proven to be more creative than the resourceful state bureaucracy, it is likely that the movement will find a way to turn darkness into strategic advantages.
In the past, activists had difficulty attracting international attention to atrocities committed by authoritarian regimes. The ongoing wave of revolution has captured the global spotlight more than ever before. Every dictator is under a media watch and any sign of resistance will definitely gain broader coverage. A picture or video clip taken on a cheap cell phone in rural Ethiopia can instantly wind up on social media. This fresh and irrefutable firsthand account will reach the biggest news outlets – fresh and unedited. There was practically no media in Libya in the early days of the protest. Gaddafi shut down all communications to the outside world. But, this did not prevent the evidence of his brutality from reaching the watchful eyes on international community, sometimes as it was happening.
Therefore, whether Meles is butchering the people of Adigrat, Gode, Moyale or Matama, the fact will be on Al Jazeera, broadcast back to his subjects and to the wider world. He cannot stop it. At the moment, dictators are at a great disadvantage. This is a golden moment that needs to be seized by all oppressed people yearning for freedom.
Composition of Military
The Egyptian army was showered with praises for its neutrality, and rightly so. However, too much credit is given to the “professionalism” of the army than other factors, such as the role of the United States and, most importantly, the strategy organizers deployed to restrain the military. By emphasizing the “professionalism” of the army, the planners made a tactical choice long before the confrontation. Once repeated by analysts and pundits alike, the army was systematically put under moral pressure to protect its image.
The primary duty of every military is to protect the government of the day. The degree of its loyalty could be different depending on connections with the ruler. A lot has been said about the loyalty of the Ethiopian military to the system. Much of the discourse focuses on the top commanders’ ethnic identification with Meles. It is true that Meles has assigned Tigreans to most of the key command positions. And, the primary rationale for this is a cold strategic calculation rather than favoritism (see my article on Tigrean Nationalism).
Unfortunately, the opposition has been attacking the strength of this strategy. They attack the military because they seem to have resigned to the assumption that all those officers are loyal to Meles. This was exactly what the strategy was designed to achieve. This strategy must change now. Correcting factual errors and myths about the composition and internal dynamics of the military is crucial. It is common to refer to the current Ethiopian military as the TPLF army. This is factually incorrect because:
a. Members of the military come from all corners of the country, and Tigreans make up no more than 10%.
b. Most of the soldiers below the rank of Colonel were not part of the rebel movement. As such, they have little ideological or personal connection with the rulers. The majority of the TPLF’s rebel soldiers were demobilized early on to engage in business activities, and some were purged while many others have retired.
The scary image about the “Agazi” division that was involved in quashing the 2005 protests needs to be reexamined. This division is described as a Tigrean-only unit or sometimes as being full of mercenaries. Anecdotal evidence shows that there are several non-Tigrean Ethiopians within the rank and file of the division, including the command. Most dictators have ‘presidential’ guards composed of elite soldiers who have proved their loyalty; this is certainly the case for Agazi. Most of the misinformation is provided by the regime to create a terrifying image of the military, and a hostile situation between the army and the people. Critics of the system have further exaggerated, the ‘otherness’ and cruelty of this division, which further terrifies the public.
Despite its role in strengthening loyalty, ethnic composition of the military does not make it more effective against nonviolent resistance. The Apartheid system in South Africa had almost an entirely White military. But, it did not save the system from crumbling under the weight of people’s power. Nonviolent strategies avoid the regime’s strong pillars and target its weakest links – what Gene Sharp calls Achilles’ heels. Instead of taking the military head on, South African strategists organized a nationwide boycott of White businesses. There was nothing the security and military could do besides harassing and arresting the key organizers. As months went by, the economic costs were unbearable even to the most racist businessmen. Thus, the cost of repression against the Black community was systematically transferred to the White community that was previously ambivalent or supported the regime. When the going got tough, the White South Africans turned up the heat on the regime, and the resulting crisis brought down the government. The hardliner P. W. Botha was replaced by a moderate F.W. De Klerk, opening the door for ‘pacted’ (bargained) transition.
As illustrated in this example, movements can employ several tactics either to avoid direct confrontation with the regimes’ means of coercion or minimize their repressive capability. The use of low-risk actions (boycotts, work stoppage, traffic jamming, etc.) at the initial stage have proved more effective.
In Ethiopia’s case, a detailed assessment is needed to devise realistic strategies to cope with the regime’s means of coercion and dissolve the military’s loyalty to the system. From the limited information available to me, I would argue that, in the face of a carefully planned and disciplined nonviolent uprising, Meles’ violent tactics will not stand a chance.
Here is a list of things to consider:
a. The local police are the primary face of the repressive machinery, particularly outside the capital. They are poorly equipped and the least skilled. They also live with people, underpaid (perhaps among the lowest paid state employees). Thus, they are as grieved as the rest of the population. But, violence and abusive behaviors are well entrenched traditions of the police. They could be merciless at first encounter, but will be the first to wither away as the uprising gathers momentum.
b. Some regional governments have their own special police – rapid response brigades whose primary responsibility is stepping in when a situation overwhelms the local police. Well armed and with better training than the local police, the rapid response lineup has a good record of containing mid-sized riots. But, its strong regional loyalty is always a threat to federal authorities.
c. The Federal Police, numbered in few thousands, are highly effective in its rapid response, is quick to be mobilized and well trained in crowd control. However, this force’s capability, discipline and morale is in decline because they are underpaid while mostly stationed in camps within major cities.
d. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) is believed to have an extended network of agents. But, it relies on the Federal Police for muscle, which is a source of tension between the leadership of the two agencies. NISS has been expanding and actively recruiting for its new branch of IT security.
The TPLF has built an impressive intelligence apparatus during its rebellion years, but the quality of its intelligence has been in a steady decline since they took power. Currently, as part of Meles’ strategy to secure their loyalty, the primary concern for many leading agents is accumulating wealth, through extortion, land sale, and partnership with the black-market sectors. Credible sources indicate that, they are busy running their own personal affairs; most agents cook up Intel that is passed on to the politicians. For example, the botched Somalia operation was largely attributed to such problems. It was under the agency’s nose that a top general recruited hundreds of soldiers and defected to a rebel movement. Agents often fail to identify actual rebel operatives, and instead, roundup innocent citizens to present to their bosses. Strangely, during last year’s reshuffle Meles has put the NISS under direct control of the Prime Minister’s office indicative of the lack of confidence in the top spy chiefs. Nevertheless, this organ is quite loyal to the system and possibly the last to defect. Yet, its culture of Intel fabrication and the widespread corruption work against the status quo.
e. The Ethiopian National Defense Force is combat tested and is relatively in good shape, but lacks experience in dealing with civilians. It has been expanding officers’ colleges and also increased production of its own light weaponry. But due to poor infrastructure and outdated vehicles, its tactical mobilization is rated poor. Yet there are several units stationed in barracks within close proximity of the capital. Thanks to Meles’ deeply anti-military sentiment (due to fear of a coup) the morale of the soldiers is low. They draw a small salary from the regime, and the rising cost of living has made it difficult, particularly for long serving career officers. Due to perceived ethnic favoritism, mutinies and high profile defections have been taking place. The regime has responded by purging or ‘grounding’ almost all Oromo and Amhara senior officers and replacing them with Tigrean loyalists. This strategy might have prevented potential coups, but makes the regime extremely vulnerable to nonviolent strategies. Since the majority of the soldiers feel marginalized, they identity with the grievances of the people, likely to turn on the system on the first sign of weakness on the part of the regime.
Overall, the state of Meles’ forces of coercion is favorable to the resistance than the status quo. Meles knows prolonged crisis will expand the crack and weaken his position. Therefore, he is likely to try intense and deadly repression during the early stage. Below are few strategic recommendations for the resistance organizers to reduce the efficiency of security forces.
· Self-restraining and organized action, nonviolent discipline are vital for co-optation;
· Increase direct or indirect contact with the military, police and security;
· Maximize social contact between the military personnel and population in order to keep them informed and engaged;
· Communication should be strategic:
o Providing reassurance about their personal and institutional future,
o Warning about personal accountability for their action or inaction,
o Appealing to their humanity (future of the children, etc.)· Physical barriers could also be used to reduce mobility of security forces.
* Jawar Mohammed is an independent researcher and a recent graduate of Stanford University. He can be reached for comments at jawarmd@gmail.com; you can also access his articles at www.dhummuugaa.wordpress.com or on OPride – Jawar’s Corner.
3 Comments
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Compromise said,
March 6, 2011 @ 4:42 am
Is Amhara-Oromo face-off a hinderance to the possible revolution in Ethiopia?
Yes, now, it is the time for the revolution against any colonizer, tyrannt or dictator, be it in Ethiopia or some where else. Almost all citizens and nations in the Ethiopian empire are now calling for the revolution as the best instrument to get rid of the fascist regime. Of course that is why Weyane is doing everything under the sky to prevent us from revolting. We know that as long as Weyane is in power, we will suffer not only as refugee in diaspora, but also as slaves at home in Oromia. Unfortunately, the Amhara-Oromo face-off is yet a hinderance to the possible revolution, i.e. it is a hinderance to the necessary change of the tyrannt regime. It seems that the Amhara-Oromo face-off (neutralizing each other) is a very good historical advantage/opportunity, which Weyane got to rule over Ethiopia without any serious challenge and this face-off didn’t get an appropriate solution. Weyane survives and thrives mainly by dividing and polarizing Amhara vs Oromo as well as by sowing fear and mistrust among/between them. We do still hear/read that both camps (the Amhara camp and the Oromo camp) do live under a grave fear and mistrust of each other, so that they seem to prefer Weyane’s further rule to the possibility of allowing each other take over any sort of power.
But, I think a well co-ordinated FDG (fincila diddaa garbummaa = non-violent popular uprising) of the Oromo people in co-operation with that of the other nations in that cursed empire is still the best way of a struggle to get rid of the fascist Weyane. Actually the Oromo people do have nothing to lose, if the expected revolution comes. One thing, beside many, in favour of the Oromo liberation movement, is the fact that Weyane will leave Finfinne palace, only after securing its goal, i.e after securing an independence of Tigrai. Of course together with such move of Weyane, Oromia’s chance to get its independence is high. Because of this reason, both the Amhara conservative feudal lords and the Western protectors of the Ethiopian empire don’t want to see Weyane being cornered. They surely know that cornering Weyane is almost tantamount to disintegrating the empire. That is why, it is not the Oromo people, but firstly the Weyane itself, secondly the colonial minded Amhara conservative elites and thirdly their Western handlers, who do fear the coming of the revolution to Ethiopia. Thus, the democratic Amhara forces pushing for the revolution are not as such dangerous for the Oromo liberation movement. Even if not Oromian independence per referendum, we can achieve Oromian autonomy through a genuine federalism within an Ethiopian union (achieve the national freedom of the Oromo people) as a result of the possible revolution.
That is why Weyane cadres are nowadays very busy to hinder the revolution from taking place in the Ethiopian empire by using the fact that the peoples of the empire are not homogeneous, but different (the colonized and the colonizer), as an instrument of division and polarization. If the scare tactics, which they try to use, hinder the revolution, the only option we the colonized people do have is the anti-colonial armed struggle, on which we have to concentrate and invest most, even though it is a very difficult job, given the little support we do have from the international community. For the revolution possibilly not to take place, unfortunately also the pro-independence freedom fighters (the Oromo, Ogaden, Sidama… liberation forces) and the pro-unity freedom fighters (the Amhara, Gurage, Harari… patriotic forces) are still mistrusting each other. Both want to secure the direction of the move after the freedom from Weyane (to secure the result after the revolution). The first bloc wants no reversal of the already achieved victory of a limited cultural autonomy on the way towards national independence (self-determination), whereas the second bloc wants to be sure that the empire stays intact and possiblly the process will be reversed back to the unitary country.
But, why should these people worry too much about the situation after the revolution? Is the caution regarding the unity of the empire, which is lamented by the pro-unity freedom fighters, different from the scare tactics used by the Weyane cadres? The cadres go to Oromo forums and tell us the “worse will come; Amhara will take over and there will never be the reality of Aayyo Oromia, if you push for the revolution”; and then they go to Amhara forums and tell them “take care, the worse will come; OLF can take over and it will be the end of Imiyee Ethiopia, if you make a revolution”. Both Aayyo Oromia and Imiye Ethiopia are actually taken hostage by the Weyane. Whenever Oromo force is stronger, Weyanes threaten with the possibility of dismantling Oromia; and whenever Amhara force is stronger, they threaten with dismembering Ethiopia.
Weyanes use the opportunity of such division among the opposition to threaten both camps of the freedom fighters. If the revolution should happen, the two camps of the freedom fighters need to be bold enough to take risk of losing their ideals after the revolution and live with a possible compromise solution: the first bloc should be ready to lose for instance Oromia, Ogadenia… and the second camp should be ready to risk Ethiopia. Otherwise, in short, Weyane is really lucky, there will never be any revolution; and getting rid of Weyane through election is of course minimal, that is why armed struggle then will be the only option left. If both the public uprising and the armed struggle are not effective, shouldn’t we then be ready to be ruled by Weyane for the next one century? In short the scare tactics, which the Weyane cadres nowadays do use are:
- “if revolution happens, Amharas can take over and dismantle Oromia”
- “if revolution happens, Oromos will be in power and dismember Ethiopia”
- “if revolution happens, Weyane army is not like Tunisia’s army, but will massacre the civillians and take over power”
- “if revolution happens, there can be a mayhem against the Tigreans, like that of Ruanda”
- “if revolution happens, there will be absolute chaos and civil war among different ethnies”
Are the freedom fighters from both blocs (pro-independence freedom fighters and pro-unity freedom fightrers) ready to tacle this scare tactics of Weyane? Can they agree on the middle ground: freedom and referendum (on self-determination of citizens and nations)? Those freedom fighters, who just sing about the unconditional independence of nations must cool down and accept the public verdict, as well as those freedom fighters who now cry for the unconditional unity also should learn to be moderates and accept the public verdict. That means both camps must agree on first to get freedom from Weyane fascists and racists, and then democratically decide for either Independence or Unity per referendum; i.e. only democratic independence or democratric unity (independence or unity based on public verdict) can be a lasting solution. We like it or not, all peoples in that region are interdependent, be it they decide for political Independence or for political Union. The political will of the peoples in the empire/region is what matters at the end!
Unfortunately, there are still some blind nationalists in both the Amhara and the Oromo camps, who yet couldn’t see the common convergent short term goal of the two big nations, i.e. the ‘freedom from Weyane’s fascism’. Such blind nationalists concentrate on only their divergent long term goals: independent Oromia (Oromo’s goal) vs united Ethiopia (Amhara’s goal). But the smart nationalists from both the Amhara and the Oromo camps are trying to forge an alliance to achieve together their convergent common short term goal and then to decide on their respective long term goals through public verdict (by referendum). The blind ones are too far from accepting and respecting the will of their respective public as a final verdict. That means, in short, the blind nationalists do preach democracy, which includes the referendum, but they are not yet ready to practice what they do preach. We hope the few smart and genuinely democratic nationalists in both camps, who try to practice what they do preach, will prevail to cooperate and make Weyane’s fascism be history. Here we also can call the blind nationalists as dictatorial nationalists. Those who want to achieve either ‘Independent Oromia’ or ‘United Ethiopia’ per public referendum are democratic Oromo nationalists and Amhara nationalists respectively. The others who just want to achieve their long term goal without a public verdict are purely dictators, who can talk about freedom and democracy, but know nothing what freedom and democracy really mean.
Those of us, who do have a cognitive ability to imagine something in abstract way, let’s just try to imagine a very big letter ‘Y’ and try to distinguish four points on the letter (the bottom tip, the middle junction, the left top tip, and the right top tip). Then let’s imagine that the bottom tip is the status-quo of Ethiopian politics, where both the Amhara and the Oromo are under the Tyranny of Weyane; the middle junction is a point for Freedom of both nations from the tyranny; the left top tip is the point of Oromian Independence; and the right top tip is the point for Ethiopian Union. Then let’s imagine that this letter ‘Y’ is a route of the liberation journy for both the Amhara and the Oromo from the tyranny, from their present common situation, towards their short term and long term goals. Can we imagine that these two oppressed nations do have a possibility to move from the bottom tip (point of tyranny) to the middle junction (point of freedom) together? This is our common route of the journey towards the common converging short term goal. Then will come the two diverging routes towards the two different and diverging long term goals of the two nations: the left top tip = Oromian Independence (long term goal of Oromo) and right top tip = Ethiopian Union (long term goal of Amhara).
Now if we could imagine this well, it is not hard to comprehend that we need the Amhara-Oromo alliance (the all-inclusive alliance) to move from the status-quo of tyranny to the point of Freedom, not to move together to the right top tip (together to the Ethiopian Union, the long term goal of the Amhara elites) or together to the left top tip (together to the Oromian Independence, the long term goal of the Oromo people). After achieving our Freedom together, it is upto the Oromo public to decide through referendum which direction to move further: to the left top tip of Oromian Independence or to the right top tip of Ethiopian Union. If the Oromo majority will choose to move to the right top tip, then our long term Kaayyoo (goal) will be similar to that of the Amhara. Otherwise, if the Oromo majority will choose to move to the left top tip, no Amhara can hinder the Oromo nation from achieving this Oromian Independence. I think there are in general three main possible karaa (ways of struggle) leading us to bilisummaa / to freedom / to netsaannet:
- Armed Struggle, which was the karaa chosen by the OLF and by the other Oromo liberation fronts,
- Popular Uprising, which is not yet tried in a well coordinated way, but now seems to be the upcoming option, and
- Electoral Struggle, which was the karaa chosen by the OFC and by the other Oromo democratic federalists, despite the undemocratic nature of Weyane in particular and that of the Abyssinian rulers of the the empire in general.
From these three karaa, we have seen that both the armed struggle and the electoral struggle were not yet successful. The armed struggle is too slow because of the limited support from the so called international community and the electoral struggle failed due to the undemocratic nature of the empire and that of its brutal rulers. The option of the popular uprising was tried separately by only the Oromo students during the time span of 2000 – 2007 and by the Amhara urbanites after the “election” 2005.
Because of such un-coordination and un-cooperation between the different nations in the empire, specially due to the polarization of the Amhara and the Oromo, the hitherto fragmented popular uprisings were not successful. But in the future, it seems that there is a hope for a possible alliance of these nations against the Weyane, which can lead to a successful uprising and also be a quicker way leading us to bilisummaa. I think the combination of the above three karaa in an optimaly calculated and planned manner is the best way towards freedom. That is why Weyane cadres nowadays do their best to hinder this revolution from coming and of course “our smart Afaan Oromo speaking/writing Weyane messangers” are trying to do their job among the Oromo, both in the cyber world and in the real Oromo community. May Waaqa/Igzabiher help us all to understand these moves of both the foes and the friends!
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Warraaqaa said,
April 14, 2011 @ 7:42 am
We like it or not, the Oromo people in particular, and all the affected nations of the empire in general, do have no other alternative to fighting in unison against this nama-nyaataa regime. All Oromo nationalists in the political spectrum of the Oromo organizations, as described below, must now build a formal or informal tokkummaa and tumsa to push together for their common ground, i.e for bilisummaa from Woyane fascism. After achieving this bilisummaa from fascism, they will have in the future a chance to compete against each other and to advocate for their respective versions of the desired Oromo national sovereignity, on which the Oromo public will decide per referendum:
- the far-left, like the UDJ struggling for a unitary Ethiopia with Oromo leadership,
- the middle-left, like the OPDO, who tries to keep the status quo of a limited Oromian cultural autonomy,
- the central-middle, like the OFC striving for a complete Oromian autonomy within Ethiopian union, i.e for a pre-walabummaa union,
- the middle-right, like the ULFO fighting for an Oromian independence/for a walabummaa, and
- the far-right, like the OLF pushing further for Oromian union, i.e for a union of the Horn region, where all Oromo clans do live, that means pushing further for a post-walabummaa union.
The political spectrum I used here is not based on a class ideology (communism vs capitalism), but the spectrum of the Oromo parties based on their view regarding the national liberation movement of the Oromo people. Here, the far-left doesn’t mean an extremist communist fascist, but it does mean the WORSE approach to the Oromo liberation struggle than that of the others; whereas the far-right means the BEST approach and the best solution to the national problem, it doesn’t imply the meaning of an extremist capitalist aparthied type of nationalism. Accordingly, UDJ is worse than the others, OPDO is the bad party, OFC the good, ULFO the better and OLF the best. Enjoy a related article from Fayyis Oromia here: http://gadaa.com/oduu/3580/2010/05/12/oromo-tokkummaa-via-the-olf-mindset-in-the-bad-opdo-the-good-ofc-the-better-ulfo-and-the-best-afd/
So, let’s all Oromo nationalists in all walk of life wake up and be united for the common noble cause of bilisummaa from the fascists and racists as a common denominator. If we can realize this freedom from fascists and then foster democratic rights in that empire/country, the Oromo nation will not have any disadvantage, what ever type of national sovereignity we will have based on the Oromo public verdict, be it ‘independent Oromia’ or ‘true Federation’ or ‘unitary Ethiopia’. That is why the OLF in particular and all the Oromo liberation froces in general should take a lead in the upcoming imminent revolution, without being distracted by the attention diversion maneuver of the Woyane.
But the question is: can we give the above mentioned five Oromo parties the original Gadaa names, for instance: UDJ = Birimaji; OPDO = Horata; OFC = Bichile; ULFO = Duulo; OLF = Robale? Otherwise looking at their respective explicit vision and just taking in to consideration the liberation journey according to the famous metaphor (the journey from Djibouti/from Garbummaa to Finfinne/to an optimal Bilisummaa):
- UDJ wants to bring back the status of an ‘Erased Oromia’ from the world map = a backward move to Djibouti,
- OPDO wants to maintain the present ‘Occupied Oromia’ by Woyane occupation force = a life in Ayesha, the desert town at the border of Djibouti,
- OFC strives a forward move to ‘Autonomous Oromia’ = a move to Diredhawa,
- ULFO fights for a further move to ‘Independent Oromia’ = further move to Adaama, and
- OLF struggles for an optimal form of bilisummaa beyond an independence, i.e for a ‘United Oromia’ in the Horn = a final journey to Finfinne.
Accordingly, we can see that UDJ’s struggle for an individual liberty of citzens is good, but its attempt to erase Oromia must be checked; OPDO is good only to hinder this attempt of erasing Oromia, but its tendency to maintain the occupied status of Oromia can not be accepted; the moves of OFC, ULFO and OLF are just complementary, if they are wise enough to synchronize their move and work in tandem to promote our liberation journey first to Diredhawa, then to Adaama and finally to Finfinne without creating an artificial conflict as they sometimes seem to do. But now as already said, we have to give a priority to getting rid of the fascist and racist Woyane regime by any means possible, including the revolution.
Of course, the current diaspora Oromo uprising may help the revolution at home erupt. But, as far as I am concerned, I am a private Oromo nationalist, who is now “living in Ayesha” (a desert town at the border to Djibouti = a metaphor depicting the political status quo of the Oromo). I actually want to move to Finfinne (a metaphor for an independent and a united Oromia). Let’s not forget the fact that UDJ, G-7 and the likes do want to realize the ‘erased Oromia’ by opposing the possible true Killil-federation (the same political status to that of the past Ethiopian regimes); they simply want to forge a Derg-type of Ethiopa, which is equivalent to a move back to Djibouti/to a complete slavery. Sure is that I will never take a drive with them from Ayesha back to Djibouti. Also let’s just think about the OPDO, who wants to give me a car lift to make a tour only in Ayesha (keeping the status quo), but never wants to help me move a single killometer towards Finfinne. Then, what is the use of driving with OPDO? Nothing! But we can look at the OFC, who wants to help me move forward to Diredhawa (an autonomous Oromia within an Ethiopian union) and we can see ULFO, who wants to bring me further to Adaama (an independent Oromia within an African union). Should I reject their help? Never! I surely will take a ride with them to both Diredhawa and Adaama. After being in Adaama, it is up to me to ask for further car lift to Finfinne (an example for not only an independent Oromia, but also for a united Oromia in the Horn region).
That is the reason for the fact that it is the time for ALL freedom fighters from all walk of life to rise up in unison against the fascists, racists and tyrants (against the Woyane regime). After getting this freedom from tyranny, the Oromo popular verdict to decide on the type of sovereignity we want to have will be excercised, which can lead us to one of the following: to UDJ’s ‘Erased Oromia’, to OPDO’s ‘Occupied Oromia’, to OFC’s ‘Autonomous Oromia’, to ULFO’s ‘Independent Oromia’ or to OLF’s ‘United Oromia’. But now, the common denominator for all these movements is the ‘freedom from Woyane’s Tyranny’, on which all of them need to cooperate. That is why the present tendency to demonstrate against the tyrants together is a very good start. Let’s ALL march together against this Evil regime.
I think this is a very nice step of a revolution to be taken, which is in the right direction as far as Oromo cause is concerned. No question that the upcoming third revolution will erupt as expected. During the first revolution in 1974, the revolutionaries had three main agenda: ‘land to the tiller’, ‘self-rule of nations’ and ‘democratic human rights’. The first demand (land to the tiller) was/is at least formally accepted since the first revolution, but not yet implemented; the second one (self-rule of nations) is also formally respected since the second revolution of 1991, but also it is not yet implemented. Now we do hope that these two agenda will be surely implemented and the third one (democratic human rights) will also be added after the success of the expected and the upcoming third revolution. Of course OLF can take the lead in this third revolution as it did during the last two revolutions.
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Gubadhdhee jiraa said,
April 21, 2011 @ 4:18 am
what am gona comment is obviously, missing the opportunity!
We specially the long term opressed indegenious, native society of the oromia of not being benefited from this Horno-subsaharan african revolution is the bad luck adventure of well politically awaked oromo youth at home ,at diaspora and every where, where we are , we are responsible and the history will request us for why we never used it , how ever i do not belive that the opportunity is past, but i believe the uprising period is already too late; i understand that how the cells of the every bodies of every where in every university is functioning, that was not now long time a go they are only victims.is that only enough are we prepared / are we extinct merely just talking not using evry cetury?please cool me down angubadhdhee.
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