Nonviolent Struggle: Ethiopian Exceptionalism? – Part II
By Jawar Mohammed*
Part II (Read the 1st Part Here)
Social Fragmentation and Civil Resistance
One of the key reasons why dictators remain in power is the fragmentation of the society across ethnic, religious, ideological, and professional lines. Whenever their power is threatened, dictators resort to using the societal fault lines to foment division and weaken dissent. Therefore, waging vertical resistance against oppressive systems require strategically addressing the horizontal tensions within the population.
a. The likelihood of success for nonviolent resistance increases with broad societal participation by diverse and all segments of the population.
b. In the presence of intra-group fear, suspicions and competition, movements are vulnerable to the divide-and-destroy tactics of the regime.
The regime’s divisive methods need to be countered with unifying strategies and tactics. For such a strategy to work, having accurate information on the causes of the fault lines and concerns of each segment of the society as well as studying past tactics employed by the regime to instigate conflict is critical. This should be followed up with strategic planning to counter the regime’s divisive methods with tactics that, not only undercut the measures, but also make it backfire against the regime.
On the day the Egyptian resistance organizers announced their plan of January 25th march, a Coptic Church was bombed. In a dramatic contrast, on the second day of the uprising, the world watched Egyptian Christians protecting Muslims during Jum’a prayer. We also saw members of the Muslim Brotherhood forming human chains against possible attack on a church. In a popular slogan, repeated by the protesters, Egyptians chanted Regardless Of Which God You Pray To, We Are All Egyptians. A picture of an Imam and a Priest holding the Koran and the Cross together sent a powerful message of unity. Such a change in a week’s time might sound as if a miracle had struck Egypt. But, the truth is all of these actions were results of prior planning.
From the outset, the organizers acknowledged the fact that Egypt has a history of communal conflict and violence. The legacy of extremist and violent religious movements still lingers. Therefore, resolving the insecurity of the Christian minority was important, not only to bring that constituency onboard and withstand Mubarak’s divisive tactics, but also address the fear of the West about a possibility of an Islamic Egyptian state. They were successful beyond expectations. It is important to note that most of the ground work was done months, if not years, before put to test at Tahrir Square.
Overcoming Meles’ Divide and Rule Tactics
Ethiopia’s history and contemporary politics has led to the development of tensions among various ethnic groups and acute ideological polarization among the political elite. Over the years, competing nationalism with contradictory assessment of the past as well as diverging visions of the future have emerged. The current regime practices open discrimination and publicly promotes communal hostility. This might make civil resistance difficult, but not impossible. It is possible to overcome these conditional challenges by expanding knowledge about nonviolent tactics and through careful strategic planning.
Meles has effectively utilized the ethnic card in the past. Early in his rule, he survived the Oromo resistance by scaring the day light out of the Amhara. He preached the Oromo rebels would, not only exact revenge against the old ruling class, but also split the country to form an independent Oromia state. Meles survived the wave of urban resistance in 2005 by scaring the previously marginalized communities about the return to the past – the Amhara oppressive rule. Furthermore, he was able to maintain the loyalty of his support base, the Tigreans, by convincing them about the possible retribution they would face, if they abandon him.
The efficiency of these strategies has significantly decreased in the past five years because:
1) The prisoner’s dilemma between the Amhara and the Oromo constituency is reaching its final stage as each side is realizing that neither benefits from the status quo. The multiple efforts at forming alliances and the significant improvements in dialogue – both in public and behind the scenes – are evidence to this. Hardliners are no longer the leading voices of each political community, and the shift in rhetoric has opened the door for calmer consultations.
2) The Tigrean constituency is no longer an uncontested domain of the ruling party. This can be attributed to two reasons.
a) Tigreans have begun to realize the only beneficiaries of current policies are Meles and a small circle of his cronies at a great cost to their people.
b) The emergence of ‘their own’ credible alternatives among the opposition is chipping away at the secure base that served Meles well. The defiance showed by the people of Tigray in support of the opposition during the recent election is an irrefutable evidence of the shifting ground.
This does not mean that all sources of divisions have disappeared. There is still a fear about post Meles era. The unrelenting rhetoric of Amhara groups to replace the current federal system is a serious concern for previously marginalized groups. Similarly, the refusal of ethno-nationalist movements to renounce demands for independence is worrisome to the Amhara. Both of these concerns are legitimate. However, a regime change via nonviolent resistance is unlikely to lead to realization of those fears.
During the Egyptian uprising, many feared the Muslim Brotherhood will take over after Mubarak and establish an Islamic caliphate. Similarly, in Pinochet’s Chile and Marcos’ Philippines, moderates and business elites feared communist takeovers. White South Africans worried about economic expropriation and physical revenge by black nationalists. Now, we know none of these fears were realized. This is one of the main differences between change through armed struggle and via nonviolent resistance. In an armed struggle, almost always a single dominant force emerges. Moreover, as a conflict is waged between two armies, the defeated military of the state is often dismantled and replaced by the rebel soldiers. This allows the winning party to have the ability to monopolize power and impose its partisan will.
Victory in civil resistance is an outcome of collaborative work among various political and social organizations, and largely that of unaffiliated individuals. Thus, the likelihood of a single group determining the outcome is negligent. Whereas the dictator and top cronies are removed, most of the state institutions, including the military remain intact. As a result, no single group will have the capability to impose partisan objectives unilaterally. In a sense, a regime change through nonviolent resistance opens doors for reform rather than ushering in a full revolution as in the case of an armed insurgency.
Therefore, the post Meles era should not be scary because:
a) The immediate power vacuum will not be filled by a single group rather by a transitional government likely dominated by moderates, including those from the old guard.
b) Constitutional writing will not be a unilateral work of a single party, but a product of an inclusive, long, and tiresome bargaining. My bet is that the current constitution will be adopted with slight amendments. Even in case of a gridlock, the issue will be settled through an electoral process.
c) Because the army and state institutions will remain intact, secessionists will not be able to break away any part of the country and have to wait for the due process.
d) If secessionists or hardcore ‘unitarists’ are unwilling to compromise on their agendas, they will have to do it through free, fair, and competitive elections and referendums. If they can garner the necessary public support, then the people have spoken, no one can stop it.
e) All of the groups calling for self-determination have indicated in different occasions that they would settle for a genuine federal structure built on a firmly democratic, representative, and equitable foundation.
Nonviolent Conflict and Fear of Civil War
When we speak of nonviolent resistance, we are talking about waging a conflict against often a repressive government to destabilize it, obstruct its normal routine, and create nervousness and uncertainty within the pillars of power to drain the systems endurance and bring it down. But unless carefully managed and guided, such confrontations create a precarious situation and could make the country and the people vulnerable to prolonged chaos.
Dictators are most dangerous at the end of their reign. They will do whatever it takes without any concern for consequences. They would use saboteurs to instigate conflicts among the population and even within the military and security apparatus – and such actions will have serious long-term consequences, particularly in fragile multinational states like Ethiopia. But, these dangers could be avoided through strategic planning.
· Organizers should anticipate every possible action the regime will take and prepare responsive tactics. Every repressive or divisive action by the regime should be met with action that strengthens the movement towards unity while de-legitimizing the system.
· Nonviolent discipline is the key to the movement’s ability to manage conflicts. The less physical violence on the part of the resisters, the more control they have over the course of the conflict and ability to maintain momentum. This can be achieved by training as many organizers as possible to build the necessary skills. Such preparation helps to identify and pacify the impact of agent provocateurs that aim to turn the situation unto uncontrolled chaos.
· Aim for quick victory, but prepare for a long struggle. A prolonged conflict could lead to a stalemate and power vacuum, where neither side controls large part of the country making it vulnerable to opportunistic spoilers. With well thought out strategic planning, it is possible to bring down a dictator within a brief period of time. Tactics can be sequenced to reinforce each other and multiply their impact on raising pressure on the status quo to quickly dismantle the pillars of support. But, unforeseen circumstances, mistakes in implementation of strategies and external factors could derail the efficiency of the movement. In such cases, it is crucial not to lose momentum for prolonged periods, which gives the regime breathing space while weakening the movement’s cohesion by inducing skepticism.
· Diversionary tactics should be employed to cover strategic vulnerability. In the case of a stalemate, new combat front should be opened. Halfway through the Egyptian revolution, Mubarak stopped attacking protesters, and tactically waited for the movement to run out of momentum. On the last days of the second week, the Egyptian regime looked unmovable. The number of protesters began dwindling with only few thousands hardcore leaders left at the square. Some opposition members began advocating for negotiation while America walked back from pressuring Mubarak, fearing the survival of his regime. The organizers responded by mobilizing a nationwide boycott. They opened new battle fronts, with fresh combatants – this time workers reinforcing the youth. This counter offensive strategy escalated the conflict, destabilizing the remaining institutions and completely crippling the state.
· If momentum continues to decline, suspending the campaign by emphasizing concession gained should be considered. There will be another round. Learn from mistakes, improvise strategies, and prepare better for the final push.
· Another way of avoiding a civil war is to make sure that no segment of the population (ethnic, religion or region) remains as the last strong hold for the dictator. Cornered in Tripoli, Gaddafi is trying to frame the conflict as a civil war between Western and Eastern Libya. I could anticipate Meles fleeing to Mekele and fortifying himself there to use Tigray as his shield. Such a move can be prevented by organizing resistance in every part of the country, thereby creating unwelcome environment everywhere. Statement of denunciation and rejection by high profile members the specific community could also help in discouraging the dictator.
Every dictator wants to limit his subjects’ imagination to a choice between living under tyranny and facing Armageddon. However, time and again, unified, disciplined and strategically planned nonviolent movements have disproved such prediction. Once people break the chain of fear and tear down the wall of tyranny, they can use the resulting civic environment to find creative solutions to their multifaceted problems. Under the watch of the free press and demand of practical results by the population, politicians who now rely on populist rhetoric will be forced to be realistic and moderate their position in order to broaden their appeal and garner electoral victory. Extremist ideologies will be put to test in competitive election or can be resisted peacefully. Public sympathy for such ideologies during repression usually does not translate into electoral support afterwards.
Conclusion: Word of Caution
There is no model revolution: The quick success of the latest revolutions have given rise to simplistic perceptions of nonviolent resistance. Commentators are debating whether the Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan or East European model should be adopted in Ethiopia. This is a misguided debate because no country can serve as a model for another. Due to differences in social structure, nature and strength of the regime, every movement must develop realistic strategies based on careful and detailed assessment of the realities on the ground. Strategies and tactics that worked in one country may fail in another. We should look into both successful and failed movements, not with hope of replicating what they have done, but to learn from their experiences and devise our own strategies to suit our unique realities.
“It’s so easy even a caveman can do it” attitude: This is yet another simplistic interpretation that underestimates the level of preparation that is needed for a nonviolent uprising to succeed. Deceived by seemingly spontaneous swelling of crowds, the importance of leadership and organization are sometimes written off as unnecessary. A nonviolent movement needs leadership, but it does not require a figurehead. Leaders of nonviolent movement are usually invisible because such resistance is not organized in the traditional hierarchical manners. There is also a need to detach the movement from personalities and their politics.
It is also important to clear up the confusion between two social phenomenons: protest and movement. Both are group action by means of expressing views aimed at influencing public opinion to bring change policy. The difference is that protest is a specific reaction to a particular event or situation. A movement, however, is a sustained series of contentious and collective public campaigns that employs varieties of tactics and methods. In a movement there is a common objective, and not only do the actors know what need to be changed, but they also have strategies to achieve it.
On the other hand, a protest could be one of the tactics used by a movement just like boycotts, sit-ins, and strikes. For example, take a rally in the aftermath a stolen election as a tactic for a movement. In case of a protest, participants would disperse after brief standoff. In a movement, protests could be preceded and followed by actions targeting the system – a sign for a larger objective than just airing grievances. Prior strategic planning can be evidenced from the unity, sequential tactics, and discipline shown by demonstrators. We would see a sustained build up of momentum, and the demonstration survives and even gets stronger in the face of a violent response from the opponent.
It takes building a movement to bring down a dictator and replace it with a democratic system. It is true certain riots could bring down a regime. But only an organized movement guided by well-planned strategy can sustain the uprising, maintain focus and unity of the public to prevent a return to dictatorship either in the hands of a military junta or due to a consolidation power by new hardliners.
Therefore, while it looks quite simple, a successful nonviolent revolution is usually the result of a sophisticated and innovative strategies and tactics. Expanding our knowledge of nonviolent strategies and building our tactical skill is essential to successfully crushing a determined and well-financed regime with absolute control over all means of coercion.
* Jawar Mohammed is an independent researcher and a recent graduate of Stanford University. He can be reached for comments at jawarmd@gmail.com; you can also access his articles at www.dhummuugaa.wordpress.com or on OPride – Jawar’s Corner.
RELATED: Nonviolent Struggle: Ethiopian Exceptionalism? – Part I
3 Comments
Full Programs: 
Compromise said,
March 2, 2011 @ 6:08 am
Obbo Jawar,
well put, thanks! Actually the Oromo people do have nothing to lose, if the expected revolution comes! One thing, beside many, in favour of the Oromo liberation movement is the fact that Weyane will leave Finfinne palace, only after securing its goal, i.e after securing independence of Tigrai. Of course together with such move of Weyane, Oromia’s chance to get its independence is high. Because of this reason, both the Amhara conservative feudal lords and the Western protectors of the Ethiopian empire don’t want to see Weyane being cornered. They surely know that cornering Weyane is almost tantamount to disintegrating the empire. That is why, it is not the Oromo people, but firstly the Weyane itself, secondly the colonial minded Amhara conservative elites and thirdly their Western handlers, who do fear the coming of the revolution to Ethiopia. Thus, the democratic Amhara forces pushing for the revolution are not as such dangerous for Oromo. If not Oromian independence per REFERENDUM, we can achieve Oromian autonomy through FEDERALISM within an Ethiopian union (FREEDOM of the Oromo people) as a result of the possible revolution.
That is why Weyane cadres are nowadays very busy to hinder the revolution from taking place in the Ethiopian empire by using the fact that the peoples of the empire are not homogeneous, but different (the colonized and the colonizer), as an instrument of division and polarization. If the scare tactics, which they try to use, hinder the revolution, the only option we the colonized people do have is the anti-colonial armed struggle, on which we have to concentrate and invest most, even though it is a very difficult job, given the little support we do have from the international community. For the revolution possibilly not to take place, unfortunately also the pro-independence freedom fighters (the Oromo, Ogaden, Sidama… liberation forces) and the pro-unity freedom fighters (the Amhara, Gurage, Harari… patriotic forces) are still mistrusting each other. Both want to secure the direction of the move after the FREEDOM from Weyane (to secure the result after the revolution). The first bloc wants no reversal of the already achieved victory of a limited cultural autonomy on the way towards national independence (self-determination), whereas the second bloc wants to be sure that the empire stays intact and possiblly the process will be reversed back to the unitary country.
But, why should these people worry too much about the situation after the revolution? Is the caution regarding the unity of the empire, which is lamented by the pro-unity freedom fighters, different from the scare tactics used by the Weyane cadres? The cadres go to Oromo forums and tell us the “worse will come = Amhara will take over and there will never be the reality of Aayyo Oromia, if you push for the revolution”; and then they go to Amhara forums and tell them “take care, the worse will come = OLF can take over and it will be the end of Imiyee Ethiopia, if you make a revolution”. Both Aayyo Oromia and Imiye Ethiopia are actually taken hostage by the Weyane. Whenever Oromo force is stronger, Weyanes threaten with the possibility of dismantling Oromia; and whenever Amhara force is stronger, they threaten with dismembering Ethiopia!
Weyanes use the opportunity of such division among the opposition to threaten both camps of the freedom fighters. If the revolution should happen, the two camps of the freedom fighters need to be bold enough to take risk of losing their ideals after the revolution and live with a possible compromise solution: the first bloc should be ready to lose for instance Oromia, Ogadenia… and the second camp should be ready to risk Ethiopia! Otherwise, in short, Weyane is really lucky, there will never be any revolution; and getting rid of Weyane through election is of course minimal, that is why armed struggle then will be the only option left. If both the public uprising and the armed struggle are not effective, shouldn’t we then be ready to be ruled by Weyane for the next one century? In short the scare tactics, which the Weyane cadres nowadays are using in forums and paltalks are:
- “if revolution happens, Amharas can take over and dismantle Oromia”
- “if revolution happens, Oromos will be in power and dismember Ethiopia”
- “if revolution happens, Weyane army is not like Tunisia’s army, but will massacre the civillians and take over power”
- “if revolution happens, there can be a mayhem against the Tigreans, like that of Ruanda”
- “if revolution happens, there will be absolute chaos and civil war among different ethnies”
Are the freedom fighters from both blocs (pro-independence freedom fighters and pro-unity freedom fightrers) ready to tacle this scare tactics of Weyane? Can they agree on the middle ground: FREEDOM and REFERENDUM (on self-determination of citizens and nations)? Those freedom fighters, who just sing about the UNCONDITIONAL independence of nations must cool down and accept the public verdict, as well as those freedom fighters who now cry for UNCONDITIONAL unity also should learn to be moderates and accept the public verdict. That means both camps must agree on first to get FREEDOM from Weyane fascists and racists, and then democratically decide for either Independence or Unity per REFERENDUM. That means, only democratic independence or democratric unity (independence or unity based on public verdict) can be a lasting solution. We like it or not, all peoples in that region are interdependent, be it they decide for political Independence or for political Union. The political WILL of the peoples in the empire/region is what matters at the end!
Unfortunately, there are still blind nationalists in both the Amhara and the Oromo camp, who yet couldn’t see the common CONVERGENT short term goal of the two BIG nations, i.e. the ‘FREEDOM from Weyane’s fascism’. Such blind nationalists concentrate on only their divergent long term goals: independent Oromia (Oromo’s goal) vs united Ethiopia (Amhara’s goal)! But the smart nationalists from both the Amhara and the Oromo camps are trying to forge an alliance to achieve together their convergent common short term goal and then to decide on their respective long term goals per public verdict (by REFERENDUM). The blind ones are too far from accepting and respecting the WILL of their respective public as a final verdict. That means, in short, the blind nationalists do preach democracy, which includes the referendum, but they are not yet ready to practice what they do preach! We hope the few smart and genuinely democratic nationalists in both camps, who try to practice what they do preach, will prevail to cooperate and make Weyane’s fascism be history! Here we also can call the blind nationalists as dictatorial nationalists. Those who want to achieve either ‘Independent Oromia’ or ‘United Ethiopia’ per public referendum are democratic Oromo nationalists and Amhara nationalists respectively. The others who just want to achieve their long term goal without a public verdict are purely dictators, who can talk about freedom and democracy, but know nothing what freedom and democracy really mean!
Those of us, who do have a cognitive ability to imagine something in abstract way, let’s just try to imagine a very big letter ‘Y’ and try to distinguish four points on the letter (the bottom tip, the middle junction, the left top tip, and the right top tip). Then let’s imagine that the bottom tip is the status-quo of Ethiopian politics, where both the Amhara and the Oromo are under the TYRANNY of Weyane; the middle junction is a point for FREEDOM of both nations from the tyranny; the left top tip is the point of Oromian INDEPENDENCE; and the right top tip is the point for Ethiopian UNITY. Then let’s imagine that this letter ‘Y’ is a route of the liberation journy for both the Amhara and the Oromo from the tyranny, from their present common situation, towards their short term and long term goals. Can we imagine that these two oppressed nations do have a possibility to move from the bottom tip (point of tyranny) to the middle junction (point of freedom) together? This is our common route of the journey towards the common CONVERGING short term goal (kaayyoo). Then after will come the two DIVERGING routes towards two different and diverging long term goals of the two nations: the left top tip = Oromian Independence (long term goal of Oromo) and right top tip = Ethiopian Unity (long term goal of Amhara).
Now if we could imagine this well, it is not hard to comprehend that we need the Amhara-Oromo alliance (the all-inclusive alliance) to move from the status-quo of tyranny to the point of Freedom, not to move together to the right top tip (together to the Ethiopian Unity goal of the Amhara) or together to the left top tip (together to the Oromian Independence goal of the Oromo people). After achieving our Freedom together, it is upto the Oromo public to decide per REFERENDUM which direction to move further: to the left top tip of Oromian Independence or to the right top tip of Ethiopian Unity. If the Oromo majority will choose to move to the right top tip, then our long term Kaayyoo will be similar to that of the Amhara. Otherwise, if the Oromo majority will choose to move to the left top tip, no Amhara can hinder the Oromo nation from achieving this Oromian Independence. May Waaqa/Igzabiher help us all to understand this move!!
(Report this comment as inappropriate.)
Fincilaa said,
March 3, 2011 @ 5:41 am
I think there are only three possiblle karaa leading us to bilisummaa:
- Armed Struggle, which was the karaa chosen by OLF and by the other Oromo liberation fronts,
- Popular Uprising, which is not yet tried in a well coordinated way, but now seems to be the upcoming option, and
- Electoral Struggle, which was the karaa chosen by OFC and by the other Oromo democratic federalists, despite the undemocratic nature of the empire.
From these three karaa, we have seen that both the Armed Struggle and the Electoral Struggle were not yet successful. The armed struggle is too slow because of the limited support from the so called international community and the electoral struggle failed due to the undemocratic nature of the empire and that of its brutal rulers. The option of the Popular Uprising was tried by only the Oromo students during the time span of 2000 – 2007 and by the Amhara urbanites after the “election” 2005 separately.
Because of the hitherto un-coordination and un-cooperation between the different nations in the empire, specially due to the polarization of the Amhara and the Oromo, the fragmented popular uprisings up to now were not successful. But in the future, it seems that there is a hope for a possible alliance of these nations against the Weyane, which can be successful and also be a quicker way leading us to the bilisummaa. I think the combination of the above three karaa in an optimaly calculated and planned manner is the best way. That is why Weyane cadres nowadays do their best to hinder this REVOLUTION from coming and of course “our smart Afaan Oromo speaking/writing Weyane messangers” are trying to do their job among the Oromo, both here in the cyber world and in the real Oromo community!
(Report this comment as inappropriate.)
Warraaqaa said,
April 14, 2011 @ 7:43 am
We like it or not, the Oromo people in particular, and all the affected nations of the empire in general, do have no other alternative to fighting in unison against this nama-nyaataa regime. All Oromo nationalists in the political spectrum of the Oromo organizations, as described below, must now build a formal or informal tokkummaa and tumsa to push together for their common ground, i.e for bilisummaa from Woyane fascism. After achieving this bilisummaa from fascism, they will have in the future a chance to compete against each other and to advocate for their respective versions of the desired Oromo national sovereignity, on which the Oromo public will decide per referendum:
- the far-left, like the UDJ struggling for a unitary Ethiopia with Oromo leadership,
- the middle-left, like the OPDO, who tries to keep the status quo of a limited Oromian cultural autonomy,
- the central-middle, like the OFC striving for a complete Oromian autonomy within Ethiopian union, i.e for a pre-walabummaa union,
- the middle-right, like the ULFO fighting for an Oromian independence/for a walabummaa, and
- the far-right, like the OLF pushing further for Oromian union, i.e for a union of the Horn region, where all Oromo clans do live, that means pushing further for a post-walabummaa union.
The political spectrum I used here is not based on a class ideology (communism vs capitalism), but the spectrum of the Oromo parties based on their view regarding the national liberation movement of the Oromo people. Here, the far-left doesn’t mean an extremist communist fascist, but it does mean the WORSE approach to the Oromo liberation struggle than that of the others; whereas the far-right means the BEST approach and the best solution to the national problem, it doesn’t imply the meaning of an extremist capitalist aparthied type of nationalism. Accordingly, UDJ is worse than the others, OPDO is the bad party, OFC the good, ULFO the better and OLF the best. Enjoy a related article from Fayyis Oromia here: http://gadaa.com/oduu/3580/2010/05/12/oromo-tokkummaa-via-the-olf-mindset-in-the-bad-opdo-the-good-ofc-the-better-ulfo-and-the-best-afd/
So, let’s all Oromo nationalists in all walk of life wake up and be united for the common noble cause of bilisummaa from the fascists and racists as a common denominator. If we can realize this freedom from fascists and then foster democratic rights in that empire/country, the Oromo nation will not have any disadvantage, what ever type of national sovereignity we will have based on the Oromo public verdict, be it ‘independent Oromia’ or ‘true Federation’ or ‘unitary Ethiopia’. That is why the OLF in particular and all the Oromo liberation froces in general should take a lead in the upcoming imminent revolution, without being distracted by the attention diversion maneuver of the Woyane.
But the question is: can we give the above mentioned five Oromo parties the original Gadaa names, for instance: UDJ = Birimaji; OPDO = Horata; OFC = Bichile; ULFO = Duulo; OLF = Robale? Otherwise looking at their respective explicit vision and just taking in to consideration the liberation journey according to the famous metaphor (the journey from Djibouti/from Garbummaa to Finfinne/to an optimal Bilisummaa):
- UDJ wants to bring back the status of an ‘Erased Oromia’ from the world map = a backward move to Djibouti,
- OPDO wants to maintain the present ‘Occupied Oromia’ by Woyane occupation force = a life in Ayesha, the desert town at the border of Djibouti,
- OFC strives a forward move to ‘Autonomous Oromia’ = a move to Diredhawa,
- ULFO fights for a further move to ‘Independent Oromia’ = further move to Adaama, and
- OLF struggles for an optimal form of bilisummaa beyond an independence, i.e for a ‘United Oromia’ in the Horn = a final journey to Finfinne.
Accordingly, we can see that UDJ’s struggle for an individual liberty of citzens is good, but its attempt to erase Oromia must be checked; OPDO is good only to hinder this attempt of erasing Oromia, but its tendency to maintain the occupied status of Oromia can not be accepted; the moves of OFC, ULFO and OLF are just complementary, if they are wise enough to synchronize their move and work in tandem to promote our liberation journey first to Diredhawa, then to Adaama and finally to Finfinne without creating an artificial conflict as they sometimes seem to do. But now as already said, we have to give a priority to getting rid of the fascist and racist Woyane regime by any means possible, including the revolution.
Of course, the current diaspora Oromo uprising may help the revolution at home erupt. But, as far as I am concerned, I am a private Oromo nationalist, who is now “living in Ayesha” (a desert town at the border to Djibouti = a metaphor depicting the political status quo of the Oromo). I actually want to move to Finfinne (a metaphor for an independent and a united Oromia). Let’s not forget the fact that UDJ, G-7 and the likes do want to realize the ‘erased Oromia’ by opposing the possible true Killil-federation (the same political status to that of the past Ethiopian regimes); they simply want to forge a Derg-type of Ethiopa, which is equivalent to a move back to Djibouti/to a complete slavery. Sure is that I will never take a drive with them from Ayesha back to Djibouti. Also let’s just think about the OPDO, who wants to give me a car lift to make a tour only in Ayesha (keeping the status quo), but never wants to help me move a single killometer towards Finfinne. Then, what is the use of driving with OPDO? Nothing! But we can look at the OFC, who wants to help me move forward to Diredhawa (an autonomous Oromia within an Ethiopian union) and we can see ULFO, who wants to bring me further to Adaama (an independent Oromia within an African union). Should I reject their help? Never! I surely will take a ride with them to both Diredhawa and Adaama. After being in Adaama, it is up to me to ask for further car lift to Finfinne (an example for not only an independent Oromia, but also for a united Oromia in the Horn region).
That is the reason for the fact that it is the time for ALL freedom fighters from all walk of life to rise up in unison against the fascists, racists and tyrants (against the Woyane regime). After getting this freedom from tyranny, the Oromo popular verdict to decide on the type of sovereignity we want to have will be excercised, which can lead us to one of the following: to UDJ’s ‘Erased Oromia’, to OPDO’s ‘Occupied Oromia’, to OFC’s ‘Autonomous Oromia’, to ULFO’s ‘Independent Oromia’ or to OLF’s ‘United Oromia’. But now, the common denominator for all these movements is the ‘freedom from Woyane’s Tyranny’, on which all of them need to cooperate. That is why the present tendency to demonstrate against the tyrants together is a very good start. Let’s ALL march together against this Evil regime.
I think this is a very nice step of a revolution to be taken, which is in the right direction as far as Oromo cause is concerned. No question that the upcoming third revolution will erupt as expected. During the first revolution in 1974, the revolutionaries had three main agenda: ‘land to the tiller’, ‘self-rule of nations’ and ‘democratic human rights’. The first demand (land to the tiller) was/is at least formally accepted since the first revolution, but not yet implemented; the second one (self-rule of nations) is also formally respected since the second revolution of 1991, but also it is not yet implemented. Now we do hope that these two agenda will be surely implemented and the third one (democratic human rights) will also be added after the success of the expected and the upcoming third revolution. Of course OLF can take the lead in this third revolution as it did during the last two revolutions.
(Report this comment as inappropriate.)