Rough English Transcript of Mr. Leenco Lata’s (also spelled Lencho Leta) Interview with EPRP’s (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party’s) PalTalk Outlet (Voice of Ethiopian Democratic Room)
[Translation by Gadaa.com team]

Listen to the interview here

Voice of Ethiopian Democratic Room (VEDR): Mr. Leenco, welcome to the Voice of Ethiopian Democratic Room (VEDR). How and when did you join the political struggle in Ethiopia? Why did you become part of an ethnonational political organization (i.e. the Oromo Liberation Front – OLF) instead of one of the multinational political parties that were present in Ethiopia at that time?

Leenco Lata (LL): Thank you for inviting me. First of all, I would like to mention that I am not here representing OLF nor do I have the right to do so. I can only speak of my prior experiences with OLF and my opinions about Ethiopian politics.

Even though I was not part of the Ethiopian Student Movement of the 1960’s and 1970’s, I was part of the youth movement aspiring to bring about political changes in Ethiopia … [inaudible segment] … [Now answering the next question] … EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Party) never had any political program that interested me. As for EPRP (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party) and MEISON (an Amharic acronym for All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement), I did not know or understand what their differences and subsequent rivalry were all about; for example, I remember that they were fighting about Amharic translations of some English words: “victory”: yachenifal or yashenifal, “proletariats”: lab-ader or wez-ader. I never understood why they killed each other over translations of mere words. Therefore, none of them had the political programs that I felt were important.

The issues that were important to me were the oppression of the Oromo people, their political worries and their economic exploitations. Therefore, I joined the movement to struggle for the Oromo political questions.

VEDR: What were your role and contributions in the founding of OLF?

LL: For two years after I had returned from completing my college education in the United States of America in 1971, I was part of an underground movement studying various political views. Around 1974, that underground movement put forth a draft political program for discussion by various Oromo groups, and in 1976 it was unanimously adopted by the founding members of OLF.

VEDR: To come back to the previous question, what was your role in the founding of OLF and who were the other founding members of OLF? And, where was the founding meeting held? Who was the first person to bring up the idea of creating OLF?

LL: The Oromo national liberation movement grew up stage by stage from the 1960’s Macha and Tuullama movement, and the Bale peasant revolt; and some of the founding members were Baro Tumsaa, Magarsaa Barii, Muhee Abdoo, Abomaa Mitikuu, Dima Nogo, and other Oromo intellectuals. But, it is not possible to say that ‘one person’ came up with idea of creating OLF.

Actually, OLF was not the first to bring up the Oromo political and economic questions. OLF was just the first organized political voice of the Oromo people – a new chapter in the Oromo national liberation movment; OLF inherited its political program from previous scattered (uncoordinated) Oromo movements.

Also, I am not comfortable talking about my contributions as I consider that self-indulgence.

VEDR: Immediately before the fall of the Derg regime in May 1991, the London Peace Conference was held to broker agreements between various competing powers in Ethiopia. However, multinational political groups, such as EPRP and MEISON, were not invited to that Conference and then to the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) founding Congress in Addis Ababa in July. How and why did this happen?

LL: OLF attended the London Peace Conference at the invitation of the US government. The main players at the Conference were EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) and Woyane (a Geez nickname for Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front or TPLF); OLF’s role at the Conference was merely a participant; we were not decision-making players at the Conference. Therefore, we did not have the power to choose who needed to participate at the Conference; for that matter, even if we did offer suggestions, no one would have heard our suggestions. The list of Conference participants was decided on by the US delegation, EPLF and TPLF. As for the invitation to the TGE founding Congress in Addis Ababa, that was all handled by Woyane.

Since we were aware of the mischievous nature of TPLF, OLF itself was reluctant in joining hands with TPLF to set up TGE. We were under extreme pressure coming from the governments of Sudan and US, and numerous promises from TPLF; it was under such conditions and hopes heralding a new Ethiopia that we joined the Conference and TGE. However, soon after we joined TGE, all promises were broken and hopes for a new Ethiopia were shattered by Woyane , and that led to OLF’s withdrawal from TGE.

At this point, I would like to point out that you [EPRP] should not regret about not being invited to the London Conference or the TGE founding Congress; you did not lose anything. You had tried to be part of the Ethiopian political process through other organizations, such as Kinijit (an Amharic nickname for Coalition for Unity and Democracy in Ethiopia), and you had seen for yourselves how fraudulent Woyane’s elections were at that time.

We came to the conclusion that Woyane was not willing to relinquish power through an electoral process after the 1992 district administration fraudulent elections. We withdrew from the government after proving that Woyane was not ready to work with us. Even if you [EPRP] were part of the government, TPLF would have treated all of us the same way.

VEDR: You have mentioned the reasons that led to the withdrawal of OLF from TGE for the most part; however, was there any specific reason that started the crack between OLF and Woyane?

LL: The infighting within TGE started to surface during the 1992 district administration elections. OLF promised its members that it would stay being part of TGE as far as free and fair elections were conducted at all levels and that it would withdraw from the government if elections became fraudulent.

Victories at the June 1992 district administration elections were stolen from us through military brute force. A British election observer noted that in Bale alone OLF was poised to win by a landslide (around 80% of the votes). Similarly, an American election observer noted that it was useless for TPLF to campaign and unnecessary for OLF to campaign for votes in Harerge; the winner was clearly OLF. However, TPLF resorted to brute force, and killed and imprisoned many OLF members. The atrocities of Woyane sent a chilling alarm that signaled the derailment of the development of democracy in Ethiopia. We came to the conclusion that TGE had stopped being a coalition government and started being a Woyane government. We withdrew from the government soon after that.

Later, we were asked (by the government of Eritrea and ambassadors from other countries) for our preconditions for rejoining the TGE at a meeting in Asmara, OLF clearly indicated that the composition of the “Ethiopian” defense force must be restructured immediately. The “Ethiopian” defense force was not assembled from all sectors of Ethiopia; the defense force was created from former TPLF rebel fighters, and as expected, its allegiance was to TPLF. Therefore, OLF put forth a proposal to create a nonpartisan defense force. We were willing to take a risk for the second time and rejoin TGE if that condition was met immediately. Even today, unless there are fundamental organizational changes in Woyane’s Ethiopian government, it is impossible to come to power through the electoral process.

VEDR: Going back to our previous discussion on the promises made to OLF when it joined TGE, why were you reluctant to join the London Conference? Also, what was the response from those involved at the Asmara meeting to OLF’s proposal to create a nonpartisan new defense force as a precondition for rejoining TGE?

LL: I will start with the second question, many at the Asmara meeting were skeptical about our proposal to create a nonpartisan new defense force; we presented detailed procedures on how to create that defense force. However, our proposal was declined, not by Woyane, but by President Isayas of Eritrea. I do not know why President Isayas took such a position about OLF’s proposal. Despite his role as a negotiator, President Isayas was first to criticize and decline our proposal as impractical – even before Woyane’s representatives had a chance to speak about it at the meeting.

Coming back to the first question, we had seen the mischievous nature of TPLF during the struggle against Derg. Like many Ethiopian political organizations, TPLF is a vanguard party. As a vanguard party, it believes that the only truth is “its truth” and that the path to the truth is known only by it. TPLF decided to reorganize the Ethiopian political and economic orders in its own ways back in 1985 – when it founded MLLT (Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray). Therefore, it was impossible to work with them in 1991 since they had already made up their minds about which way to take the country.

Before OLF attended the 1991 London Conference, the Central Committee of OLF decided not to participate in the future new Ethiopian government. However, once we were in London, we were put under extreme pressure by the representatives of Sudan, US and Eritrea to join the future new government of Ethiopia (TGE). Those members of OLF attending the London meeting reconsidered the Central Committee’s decision when we learned about the main aspects of the future government’s Chart, which we drafted with Eritrea and TPLF. The Charter in principle was in line with what OLF was struggling for at the time.

The Central Committee of OLF reconvened to discuss on the outcomes of the London Conference. The Conference participants presented the Committee with the draft Chart and explained the situation under which OLF was pressured to be part of TGE. We left it up on the Committee to recall its initial decision about not joining TGE or to send me directly to the prison since I led the OLF delegation into this commitment to join TGE against the Central Committee’s decision. The Central Committee finally decided to be part of TGE – so we headed to Addis Ababa in 1991.

Our reluctance to join TGE was, therefore, based on past experiences we had had with TPLF and the Ethiopian political history of intolerance, arrogance and greed. As for Eritrea, their interest was, according to our analysis, to have many friendly forces in Ethiopia. However, Eritrea was instrumental in allowing Woyane to be the only player in Ethiopia, and history had shown that was a mistake when Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war with each other as soon as Woyane consolidated enough power in Ethiopia.

VEDR: What were the details of the proposal for creating the nonpartisan multinational Ethiopian defense force (proposal presented at the Asmara meeting)? Also, why did the proposal for a new Ethiopian defense force got declined just because President Isayas did not like it? Did he have that much strong hand in Ethiopian politics at the time?

LL: In general, the other countries’ ambassadors at the Asmara meeting had this deep-rooted suspicion about OLF – I never understood it fully. With the except the Swedish ambassador, all the others were very cold towards OLF. The Swedish ambassador found out the mischievous nature of TPLF at the meeting, and later was in conflict with the Woyane government. That being the setting for the meeting, the German ambassador did ask President Isayas about his decline of OLF’s proposal. President Isayas had said it was practical, but was not willing to entertain the proposal. Everyone at the meeting noted that as a political decision.

Yes, President Isayas had, at that time, great influences on the politics of the whole Horn of African region; for example, he was involved in the affairs of Somalia, Rwanda and Congo. Eritrea was essentially a regional super power … [inaudible segment] …

Our proposal was for the temporary deployment of the United Nations security force to replace Woyane’s defense force while a new commission explored ways to organize a new nonpartisan defense force or to have both our and Woyane’s forces to be stationed as temporary security forces while a new nonpartisan defense force was recruited to take over responsibilities. These were the details of the proposal I remember for now.

VEDR: I would like to ask you about a rumor I had heard about a meeting between OLF and EPRP in Khartoum a few years before 1991. Is that true?

LL: What is surprising is I do not remember any relationship between EPRP and OLF. We did not have any organizational conflict against one another, and even if there had been a meeting, I do not remember it being that substantive. I do not know the reason for this lack of relationship, but I suspect that EPRP considered OLF as “narrow-minded” as an organization and OLF considered EPRP as “colonialist” as an organization; therefore, there was no eagerness from each side to create that relationship. I do not know about EPRP, but OLF never had any eagerness to form alliance with EPRP. I was the deputy secretary of the western front of OLF at that time, and I received no reports of such a meeting between EPRP and OLF.

VEDR: Some Ethiopian groups spread the fear about OLF – especially, about the dismemberment of Ethiopia and ethnic conflict. What do you feel about this negative propaganda?

LL: OLF used to struggle for the total independence of Oromia from Ethiopia. We, including myself, believed on this up until our involvement in TGE. After our withdrawal from TGE, the world political order, including Horn of Africa’s, changed drastically. In addition, there was a change in Ethiopia. Therefore, I took a different position on the question of Oromia’s independence – different from my colleagues. I believed that a democratic and truly federal system in Ethiopia was highly beneficial to the Oromo people. I had also indicated this in my first book. This position has generated strong criticisms against me from OLF members and supporters. What is OLF’s official position on the question of Oromia’s independence now? I do not know that clearly.

However, the notion that OLF’s position on independence would lead to the dismemberment of Ethiopia is unfounded. For that matter, if OLF leaders, for instance, choose to participate in a democratic Ethiopia, they will still get accused of dominating Ethiopia since the Oromo people constitute the largest voting block in Ethiopia. I am sure these same people accusing OLF of dismembering Ethiopia will then say to the smaller ethnic groups in Ethiopia, OLF and the Oromo people are about to rule over them. Again, if OLF chooses to advance Oromo’s independence agenda only, then it will get accused of dismembering Ethiopia.

OLF’s and the Oromo people’s political decisions are also influenced by Ethiopianist political groups referring to the Oromo struggle as “clan politics”. This type of agitation against Oromo can lead to many, including myself, to not want to live in the Ethiopian framework. A clan, by Oromo’s definition of the word, is a smaller form of human organization. The Oromo people belong to a nation, not a clan. As a nation, I believe the Oromo people have the right to self-administer themselves.

{End of Interview}

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